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COMPELLED TO TESTIFY: AN EVALUATION OF  
32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 AND THE PRIVILEGE FOR MAINE 
LICENSED CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKERS 
Juliana Kirkland O’Brien* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The mental health industry is big business: the National Institute of Mental 
Health reports that in 2012, 43.7 million people ages eighteen and older (18.6% of 
U.S. adults) experienced issues associated with a mental illness.1  In Maine, about 
51,000 adults and approximately 13,000 children suffer from a serious mental 
illness.2  According to the World Health Organization, mental illness “accounts for 
more disability in developed countries than any other group of illnesses, including 
cancer and heart disease”3 and in Maine, mental health issues coupled with 
substance abuse is the leading cause of disability and death for Mainers between 
ages fifteen and forty-four, and is the second leading cause of disability among all 
ages.4  
While many people experience a mental health issue at some point in their 
lives, upwards of eighty percent can maintain “normal, productive lives” if they 
have access to effective treatment.5  However, unlike medical issues that can be 
diagnosed with a blood test or biopsy, mental health diagnosis and treatment 
depends largely on the patient’s disclosures to mental health professionals.  
Psychotherapy is an example of an effective mental health treatment for 
anxiety disorders, mood disorders, addictions, eating disorders, and personality 
disorders.6  In addition, psychotherapy can be helpful for individuals looking to 
relieve stress, resolve conflict, and deal with other difficult life issues.7  In an 
attempt to help individuals manage or overcome their mental health issues, 
psychotherapists encourage patients to articulate their thoughts, urges, and 
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Deirdre Smith, Peter Guffin and Elizabeth Stout for their valuable feedback and guidance, the Maine 
Law Review editors and staff for their hard work in the editing process, as well as my family and friends 
for their unyielding support. 
 1. Any Mental Illness (AMI) among Adults, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/prevalence/any-mental-illness-ami-among-adults.shtml (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2014) (“As noted, these estimates of AMI do not include substance use disorders, such as 
drug- or alcohol-related disorders.”). 
 2. State Statistics: Maine, NAMI STATE ADVOCACY 2010, https://www.nami.org/ 
ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm?ContentFileID=93497 (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).  
 3. John M. Grohol, CDC Statistics: Mental Illness in the US, PSYCHCENTRAL (Sept. 4, 2011), 
http://psychcentral.com/blog/archives/2011/09/03/cdc-statistics-mental-illness-in-the-us/. 
 4. The Tipping Point: Mental Health in Maine 2010, NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS 
(NAMI), http://www.nami.org/Content/Microsites186/NAMI_Maine/Home174/Welcome_to_NAMI_ 
Maine1/Updatedthetippingpoint-communitymentalhealthinmaine(2).pdf  5 (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).  
 5.  Substance Abuse and Mental Health Service: Message, MAINE.GOV, http://www.maine.gov/ 
dhhs/samhs/mentalhealth/message.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).  
 6. Tests and Procedures: Psychotherapy, MAYO CLINIC (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.mayoclinic.org 
/tests-procedures/psychotherapy/basics/why-its-done/prc-20013335.  
 7. Id. 
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concerns in a safe, confidential therapeutic session. 
Today, “psychotherapy” encompasses many professional subsets, including 
psychiatrists, psychologists, and licensed clinical social workers (LCSWs). Patients 
seeking mental health services can choose between a variety of professionals for 
similar mental health treatment, although LCSWs are usually more affordable than 
other licensed mental health workers.8  In addition, the professional outlook for 
social work is projected to increase by 19% between 2012 and 2022.9  Therefore 
LCSWs will have an amplified ability to impact society and the individual patient 
through their increased professional outreach.10  
While LCSWs have not always been considered psychotherapists that require 
the same legal protections as the other classifications, the laws have adjusted to 
include LCSWs due to the fact the profession provides a “significant amount of 
mental health treatment.”11  Given the important role that psychotherapy plays in 
society, there are several duties and laws in place that delicately balance between 
offering privacy to the patient, and protecting the public from dangerous situations. 
In 1977, at a time where the Maine Rules of Evidence did not provide a 
privilege for social workers, the Maine State Legislature enacted 32 M.R.S.A.  
§ 7005—a licensing statute that also gives a conditional privilege for social 
workers.12  This provision is considered “conditional” because it exists unless an 
individual’s “physical or mental condition” is at issue, or a court decides the 
provision does not further the interest of justice.13   
In 2008, the Maine Rules of Evidence expanded to include LCSWs into the 
full protections of the state psychotherapist-patient privilege.14  However, 32 
M.R.S.A. § 7005, and its conditional exception remain and, due to the hierarchy of 
the laws, still governs.  Therefore, while it appears that Maine LCSWs are 
protected under the Maine Rules of Evidence, an antiquated statute provides an 
exception to this protection. 
In 2013, the Maine District Court (Biddeford, Douglas, J.) applied this statute 
in a Protection From Abuse (PFA) context, and held that, despite the Rules of 
Evidence, a clinical social worker could be compelled to testify at a PFA hearing in 
which a potential victim sought legal protection from a family member, based upon 
an alleged homicidal threat made in a psychotherapy session.15  The court relied on 
32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 to compel the testimony.  Such an exception has been termed 
“the dangerous-patient exception” because the enumerated privilege would give 
way in the event that the patient posed a danger to another individual.16   
As it now stands, patients of Maine LCSWs are not as protected as the Maine 
                                                                                                     
 8.  Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1996). 
 9. Social Workers Job Outlook, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 
(Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/community-and-social-service/social-workers.htm#tab-6.  
 10. See Licensed Clinical Social Worker – LCSW, HUMAN SERVICES EDU., 
http://www.humanservicesedu.org/licensed-clinical-social-worker-lcsw.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2014). 
 11. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15. 
 12. 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 (1999 & Supp. 2013). 
 13. Id. 
 14. State of Maine Supreme Judicial Court; Amendments to the Maine Rules of Evidence, COURT 
RULES (July 7, 2008) http://www.cleaves.org/2008Me.Rules10.pdf. 
 15. Donaldson v. Donaldson, No. PA-13-287 (Me. Dist. Ct., Biddeford, Aug. 19, 2013).  
 16. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 583 (6th Cir. 2000).  
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Rules of Evidence would suggest, and 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 threatens not only the 
legal protections afforded to these patients, but also the fundamental concepts that 
provide for effective mental health treatment.  This article argues that 32 M.R.S.A. 
§ 7005 must be amended to acknowledge and mirror the expanded protections 
given to LCSWs under the Maine Rules of Evidence, and recommends that, until 
the Statute is addressed, Maine courts limit their discretion under the Statute to 
only extreme circumstances, such as an imminent threat of harm against another 
individual.  
Part II discusses the protections that are in place for psychotherapy patients 
designed to encourage individuals to seek and receive effective mental health 
treatment.  This includes the ethical duty of confidentiality and the psychotherapist-
patient privilege.  Part III examines the exceptions in place to protect the public 
against dangerous patients.  Part IV examines the issues that Maine LCSWs face 
due to the conflict of laws, and Part V provides the interim and long-term solution 
to this problem. Finally, Part VI concludes that, with the proper protections in 
place, patients of Maine LCSWs can feel comfortable to continue treatment without 
the fear of compelled disclosure. 
II.  PROTECTING THE PATIENT 
“[C]onfidentiality is a sine qua non for successful psychiatric treatment[;]”17 
the effectiveness of the psychotherapy experience depends on the level of trust that 
is built between a patient and her counselor.18  Based on this founding concept, 
confidentiality is seen as a necessary component for a patient to “receive the best 
medical care.”19  In order to facilitate the goal of a confidential exchange of 
information, there are layers of protections for the patient’s disclosed statements 
and information.20 
This Part will briefly look at the role and duty of confidentiality as well as the 
legal privilege that protects psychotherapy patients; the former prevents a mental 
health expert from volunteering the information obtained from the therapeutic 
sessions, and the latter prevents a therapist from being compelled to testify against 
his or her patient in a testimonial hearing.  Each is a result of the recognition that 
individuals will be more open and honest in a therapeutic session if they are not 
concerned that their innermost thoughts might be made public.21 
A.  The Role of Confidentiality in Psychotherapy 
Privacy in the medical field is founded on the principle that doctors should 
                                                                                                     
 17. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 (quoting Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Rules, 56 F.R.D. 183, 
242 (1972)). 
 18. Disclosures of information: Thought on a process, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION 
(April 2007), http://www.apa.org/monitor/apr07/ethics.aspx.   
 19. Hindi T. Mermelstein & Joel J. Wallack, Confidentiality in the Age of HIPAA: A Challenge for 
Psychosomatic Medicine, PUBMED.GOV (Apr. 2008) 97 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18354061.  
 20. Adult Mental Health: Rights and Legal Issues, MAINE.GOV, http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/ 
samhs/mentalhealth/rights-legal/confidentiality-statement.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2014).  
 21. See Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of 
the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REV. 893, 898 (1982). 
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have the most accurate information to render a proper diagnosis.22  Ensuring 
privacy in the medical field serves significant private and public interests by 
limiting individual suffering and reducing overall ailments in the society.  The need 
for confidentiality is particularly acute with respect to mental health treatment, 
where the patient is verbally disclosing intimate details of their life, where, if 
revealed to the public may result in negative stigmas,23 discrimination in 
employment,24 and overall embarrassment and hesitation to continue seeking help. 
Psychotherapy is a type of treatment where a patient speaks with a mental 
health provider, such as a LCSW, to identify the internal challenges that may be 
impacting their everyday life.25  Sigmund Freud, the “father of psychoanalysis” 
believed that certain mental or emotional issues manifest because the patient is 
subconsciously trying to address repressed internal conflicts – if a patient keeps 
these thoughts in the unconscious, it would result in mental illness; however, if the 
patient discusses the memories, thoughts or urges, the symptoms would decrease. 26  
Freud’s work focused on the relationship between the analyst and patient, 
where the analyst is limited to only the role of “listening and talking to the patient” 
in order to free the patient’s ego.27 However, in order to create this 
psychotherapeutic relationship and provide effective treatment, Freud believed that 
confidentiality was necessary.28  Observation changes behavior; a patient will be 
less likely to reveal their innermost thoughts and conflicts if they believe that an 
untrusted person is watching or listening, or that the information could be used 
against them at a later time.29  It became understood that patients would resist 
disclosing these repressed thoughts and feelings unless he or she has control over 
the information they reveal.30  
Confidentiality helps build a strong therapeutic relationship because a patient 
will feel less inhibited to disclose their secret thoughts, and can establish a bond 
                                                                                                     
 22. JONATHAN I. EZOR, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION IN BUSINESS: LAWS & PRACTICES 101 
(2012).  
 23. Mayo Clinic Staff, Mental Health: Overcoming the Stigma of Mental Illness, MAYO CLINIC 
(May 17, 2014), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/mental-illness/in-depth/mental-
health/art-20046477. 
 24. EZOR, supra note 22, at 102. 
 25.  MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1974). 
 26. See, e.g., Jim Haggerty, History of Psychotherapy, PSYCH CENTRAL, http://psychcentral.com/lib/history-
of-psychotherapy/000115 (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) (“While there were scattered references to the value of 
‘talking’ in the treatment of emotional problems . . . Sigmund Freud developed psychoanalysis around the turn of 
the century, and made profound contributions to the field with his descriptions of the unconscious . . . and his 
model of the human mind.”). 
 27. JAN EHRENWALD, THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOTHERAPY: FROM HEALING MAGIC TO ENCOUNTER 
647 (1991). 
 28. See, e.g., id. 
 29. Elisia Klinka, Note, It’s Been A Privilege, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 863, 899-901, n.277 (citing a 
1962 study completed by the Yale Law Journal where 71% of people surveyed indicated that they would 
be less likely to fully reveal their thoughts to the counselor without a protection of confidentiality).  
 30. Deborah Paruch, Comment, From Trusted Confidant to Witness for the Prosecution: The Case 
Against the Recognition of A Dangerous-Patient Exception to the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 9 
U. N.H. L. REV. 327, 392 (2011); see also Deirdre M. Smith, An Uncertain Privilege: Implied Waiver 
and the Evisceration of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Federal Courts, 58 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 79, 90 (2008).  
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with the psychotherapist based on that trust.31  A patient’s ability to “shield” 
himself from “public view” leaves open the possibility for the exchange of personal 
information.32 
While Freud’s theories were just the beginning for the modern schools of 
psychotherapy,33 the basic principles regarding the need for confidentiality have 
remained.34 For example, the American Psychological Association notes that, 
“[c]onfidentiality is a respected part of psychology’s code of ethics” and that 
additional laws exist to protect the patient’s privacy.35  In addition, the importance 
of confidentiality and privacy in psychotherapy is noted in case law: in Jaffee v. 
Redmond, the United States Supreme Court noted that psychotherapy relies on the 
patients’ willingness to speak freely, and it would be “difficult, if not impossible 
for [a psychiatrist] to function without being able to assure . . . patients of 
confidentiality.”36  Understanding that privacy is paramount to the success of health 
treatment, federal, 37 state,38 and professional guidelines39 take certain measures to 
protect medical information.40   
For example, federal statutes such as the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) provide protections for the information held by 
“covered entities” and give patients “an array of rights” concerning that 
information.41  “Ensuring strong privacy protections is critical to maintaining 
individuals’ trust in their health care providers and willingness to obtain needed 
                                                                                                     
 31. Ellen McGrath, Between Client and Therapist, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Aug. 20, 2012), 
http://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/200308/between-client-and-therapist. 
 32. Gregg David Josephson, “Couching the Law of Privilege": Supreme Court Recognition of 
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond, 19 WHITTIER L. REV. 533, 552 (1998). 
 33. Haggerty, supra note 26. 
 34. Id. (stating that for the next 50 years, psychotherapy relied on Freud’s scholarship and in the 
1950s, new methods were developed alongside the expansion of American psychology; however the 
need for confidentiality remained steadfast). 
 35. Protecting your privacy: Understanding confidentiality, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.apa.org/helpcenter/confidentiality.aspx (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
 36. Jaffee v. Redmond, 501 US 1 (2006) (quoting Advisory Committee’s Notes to Proposed Rules, 
56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972)).  
 37. See, e.g., Health Information Privacy, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) (HHS published a final Privacy Rule in 
December 2000, which was later modified in August 2002. This Rule set national standards for the 
protection of individually identifiable health information by three types of covered entities: health plans, 
health care clearinghouses, and health care providers who conduct the standard health care transactions 
electronically.  Compliance with the Privacy Rule was required as of April 14, 2003 (April 14, 2004, for 
small health plans)); 45 C.F.R. § 164.105 (2013); 42 C.F.R. § 51 (2013). 
 38. See, e.g., 22 M.R.S.A. §1711-C (2004 & Supp. 2013); 34-B M.R.S.A. § 1207 (2010); 34-B 
M.R.S.A. § 3608(1)(F) (2010). 
 39. Off. of Adult Mental Health, Chapter 7: Rules Governing the Disclosure of Information Pertaining to 
Mentally Disabled Clients, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/rules/10/chaps10.htm#193 (last visited Sept. 13, 2014); Ethical Principles of 
Psychologists and Code of Conduct, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2014) [hereinafter APA Duty of Confidentiality]. 
 40. Understanding Health Information Privacy, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) (While HIPAA is an 
important part of medical privacy, this article will be focusing on protection for disclosed information in 
the course of treatment.). 
 41. Id. 
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health care services, and these protections are especially important where very 
sensitive information is concerned, such as mental health information.”42  By 
providing protection to these private conversations, patients can feel more 
comfortable addressing the real roots of their problems without fear of social or 
legal persecution.  
B.  The Duty of Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is an ethical concept usually imposed upon psychotherapists 
through a professional or legal duty.  For example, the American Psychological 
Association (APA) issues the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of 
Conduct that consists of five general principals and specific ethical standards, 
including the “primary obligation” of maintaining confidentiality.43  This duty 
prevents a psychotherapist from voluntarily disclosing the patient’s information. 
In addition, according to the National Association of Social Workers, “[s]ocial 
workers should protect the confidentiality of clients . . . to the extent permitted by 
law.”44  The Clinical Social Work Association promotes a duty to “maintain the 
privacy of both current and former clients, whether living or deceased, and to 
maintain the confidentiality of material that has been transmitted to them in any of 
their professional roles.”45 
Despite the value that absolute confidentiality might have on the therapeutic 
relationship, this duty must give way in certain circumstances.  For example, the 
APA’s Ethical Standards rule 4.01 states that the duty of confidentiality exists, 
“recognizing that the extent and limits of confidentiality may be regulated by 
law.”46  Similar conditions are in place for social workers: “[c]onfidentiality is a 
basic principle of social work intervention.  It ensures the client that what is shared 
with the social worker will remain confidential, unless there is an ethical or legal 
                                                                                                     
 42. HIPPA Privacy Rule And Sharing Info. Related to Mental Health, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERV., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/special/mhguidance.html (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
 43. APA Duty of Confidentiality, supra note 39.  Psychologists have a primary obligation and take 
reasonable precautions to protect confidential information obtained through or stored in any medium, 
recognizing that the extent and limits of confidentiality may be regulated by law or established by 
institutional rules or professional or scientific relationship. 4.02 Discussing the Limits of 
Confidentiality: (a) Psychologists discuss with persons (including, to the extent feasible, persons who 
are legally incapable of giving informed consent and their legal representatives) and organizations with 
whom they establish a scientific or professional relationship (1) the relevant limits of confidentiality and 
(2) the foreseeable uses of the information generated through their psychological activities. (b) Unless it 
is not feasible or is contraindicated, the discussion of confidentiality occurs at the outset of the 
relationship and thereafter as new circumstances may warrant. (c) Psychologists who offer services, 
products, or information via electronic transmission inform clients/patients of the risks to privacy and 
limits of confidentiality.”). 
 44. Ethics, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS, https://www.socialworkers.org/ 
nasw/ethics/default.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2014). 
 45. Ethics Code, CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKERS ASSOCIATION, http://www.clinicalsocialworkassociation.org/ 
about-us/ethics-code (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
 46. APA Duty of Confidentiality, supra note 39.  
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exception.”47 
While these exceptions vary depending on the jurisdiction, psychotherapists 
generally need to disclose information when mandated by law, or to protect the 
patient, psychotherapist, or third party from harm, including cases of child abuse.48   
According to the Mayo Clinic, general situations where a psychotherapist may 
disclose otherwise confidential information include threatening to “harm yourself 
or commit suicide,” threatening to “harm or take the life of another person . . . 
abusing a child or a vulnerable adult,” or “being unable to safely care for 
yourself.”49  As discussed below, the notable circumstances that may require a 
psychotherapist to disclose the confidential information center on protecting the 
patient or the public. 
According to the APA, unless the situation falls within “client consent, legal 
mandate [or] legal permission” the psychotherapist may not disclose the protected 
information.50  In the event that a psychotherapist discloses a patient’s confidential 
information in an unauthorized way, the psychotherapist faces legal and 
professional consequences.51  As such, psychotherapy patients can generally rely 
on their therapist to maintain a duty of confidentiality—to keep secret the 
confessed details of their lives—so long there is no intervening legal or ethical duty 
to disclose.  
C.  The Legal Privilege 
Unlike the ethical duty of confidentiality, privileges prevent certain individuals 
from being compelled to disclose protected information in legal context.  
Therefore, even if a psychotherapist discloses information under an exception to 
the ethical duty, the information is still protected from disclosure in a testamentary 
hearing.  Usually, privileges are covered by the rules of evidence governing that 
jurisdiction, and make this information inadmissible.52  However, states can impose 
governing statutes that regulate the admissibility of otherwise privileged 
information.53 
The rules of evidence are generally designed to increase the “reliability of the 
                                                                                                     
 47. NASW Standards for Clinical Social Work in Social Work Practice, National Association of 
Social Workers 15 (2005), http://www.socialworkers.org/practice/standards/ 
naswclinicalswstandards.pdf. 
 48. Stephen Behnke, Disclosing confidential information, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/04/disclosing-information.aspx (last visited Nov. 20 
2014). 
 49. Mayo Clinic Staff, Psychotherapy, MAYO CLINIC (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.mayoclinic.org/ 
tests-procedures/psychotherapy/basics/what-you-can-expect/prc-20013335. 
 50. Disclosing confidential information, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/04/disclosing-information.aspx (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).  
 51. Daniel Goleman, What You Reveal To A Psychotherapist May Go Further, N.Y. TIMES , April 
14, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/14/health/what-you-reveal-to-a-psychotherapist-may-go-
further.html ("Any licensed therapist who breaches confidentiality without a patient's approval is open 
to a lawsuit and can lose his license for violating professional ethics."). 
 52. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 501- 502; M.R. Evid. 502–514. 
 53. See, e.g., 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005. 
2014] COMPELLED TO TESTIFY 139 
fact-finding process” by allowing probative evidence to come into the record.54   
However, another role of the rules of evidence is to exclude unreliable or highly 
prejudicial evidence from the courtroom.55  Privileges are a unique aspect of the 
law because the fact-finder is specifically blocked from relevant and perhaps even 
reliable information: “[e]videntiary privileges are the primary example of rules that 
exclude evidence for the purpose of promoting extrinsic substantive policies that 
exist outside of litigation.”56  As a result, privileges are at variance with the 
ordinary evidentiary objectives, such as what Chief Justice Vinson called the 
public’s right to “every man’s evidence.”57   
The logic behind attaching a privilege to certain communications is that 
protecting the underlying relationships serves a greater purpose for society than 
does the need for the evidence.58  Privileges have been acknowledged to protect 
communications between an attorney and his or her client, between spouses, and 
between the physician and his or her patient in an effort to encourage the open 
exchange of information.59 
On the whole, there are four fundamental conditions necessary for a 
communication to be covered by the evidentiary privilege:  
1) The information must have been conveyed in “confidence that [it] will not be 
disclosed;” 60 
2) Confidentiality must be necessary to maintain the relationship;61 
3) The relationship supported by the privilege must be one that greater society 
recognizes as appropriate and necessary;62 and 
4) The disclosure would cause more harm to the relationship than the benefit 
accomplished from the confidentiality.63 
While legal privileges protect a variety of relationships, the privilege 
protecting psychotherapists, like the attorney-client privilege, is born out of a 
professionally built relationship.  In Upjohn Co. v. U.S., the Court held that the 
purpose of the attorney-client privilege “[i]s to encourage full and frank 
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader 
public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.”64  It is 
                                                                                                     
 54. Paruch, supra note  30 at 331. See also Deirdre M. Smith, An Uncertain Privilege: Implied 
Waiver and the Evisceration of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Federal Courts, 58 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 79, 90 (2008) (“While other evidentiary rules aim to improve the reliability of evidence, leading 
to enhanced truth-seeking by fact finders and more efficient trials, privileges provide benefits outside 
adjudication, such as the preservation or protection of certain interpersonal relationships. Such purposes 
are central to many evidentiary privileges recognized today, including those shielding communications 
arising in marital, attorney-client, and clergy-believer relationships.”). 
 55. See Anthony Parsio, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The Perils of Recognizing A 
"Dangerous Patient" Exception in Criminal Trials, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 623 (2007). 
 56. Id. at 623. 
 57. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).  
 58. See Parsio, supra note 55 at 624. 
 59. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 285 (3d ed. 2012).  
 60. 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW  527 (1961). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
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essential to the professional relationship that the lawyer be “fully informed by the 
client” in order to render the proper advice.65  
On a similar theory, the psychotherapist-patient privilege looks to protect the 
professional relationship between a mental health expert and her patient by 
encouraging full disclosure of information.66  If a patient is fearful that the therapist 
may disclose these secrets to anyone outside the trusted space of therapy, the 
patient could be inhibited from revealing those innermost thoughts.  The privilege 
is in place to protect that information and to encourage those who need the support 
of therapy to seek it without fear that their personal life will be made public; to 
further the right to privacy—what Warren and Brandeis termed the right to be “[l]et 
alone.”67 
The value of the therapeutic relationship has been affirmed time and time 
again in the psychotherapy profession, as well as federal and state courts.  For 
example, the Court in Jaffee, when recognizing a federal privilege, focused 
primarily on the value of the therapeutic relationship,68 and the benefit to society in 
protecting that relationship.69 
Like the spousal and attorney-client privileges, the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege is rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust. . . . Effective 
psychotherapy, by contrast, depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust 
in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, 
emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for 
which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential 
communications made during counseling sessions may cause embarrassment or 
disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of disclosure may impede 
development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment.70 
Privileges improve the medical relationship because the patient can “[f]eel free to 
make a full disclosure of information to the physician in order that the physician 
may most effectively provide needed services.”71  Understanding that the 
conversations between a mental health expert and her patient are essential for 
treatment, both state and federal courts currently apply the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege. 
D.  Development of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege 
The first reported decision of a court recognizing a psychotherapist-patient 
                                                                                                     
 65. Id. 
 66. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996).  
 67. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 
(1890). 
 68. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 6 (“Reason tells us that psychotherapists and patients share a unique 
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 69. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11 (“The mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a 
public good of transcendant importance.”). 
 70. Id. at 10 (internal citations omitted) 
 71. Ralph Ruebner & Leslie Ann Reis, Hippocrates to Hipaa: A Foundation for A Federal 
Physician-Patient Privilege, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 505, 572 (2004) (quoting Codes of Professional 
Responsibility: Ethics Standards in Business, Health, and Law (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 4th ed. 1999)). 
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privilege was in 1952 in the Illinois Cook County Court.72  In that case, the plaintiff 
petitioned to have the defendant’s medical records produced and to have the 
treating doctor testify.73  The hospital witnesses claimed that the 
“[c]ommunications between the patient and the physician are privileged,” and that 
this protection included psychiatric treatment.74  
The court held that the information resulting from psychiatric treatment was 
protected: “I am persuaded that the courts will guard the secrets which come to the 
psychiatrist and will not permit him to disclose them . . . the privilege ought to be 
granted and protected.”75  
The Illinois Cook County Court held that the privilege protecting 
psychotherapy patients is different from the established physician-patient or 
attorney-client privileges because psychotherapy is “based on confidence” and if 
courts compelled the disclosure it would be an “abuse of that confidence.”76  
Because the psychotherapy relationship is “unique and not at all similar to the 
relationship between a physician and patient” it requires a different privilege.77 
An “ordinary physician” looks for his or her patient to reveal the physical 
symptoms in order to try to identify the “particular malady” that ails the person.78 
In contrast, the psychotherapist is trying to identify the cause of the patient’s 
mental and emotional distress.79 In doing so, a psychotherapists investigates the 
patient’s experiences during childhood and adolescence; “[i]n fact, what he seeks 
to do is to bring back to the conscious memory of the patient things forgotten but 
which lied dormant in the subconscious mind.”80 The particularity of this 
treatment requires the psychotherapist to “get that information out of the mouth of 
his patient.” 81  
The court’s analysis reflects the rationale supporting the ethical duty of 
confidentiality—the nature and importance of the mental health treatment requires 
serious professional and legal protections.  Because psychological treatment 
requires both a more in-depth analysis into the patient’s thoughts and more 
complete disclosure of these facts, the necessity for a separate privilege to protect 
the communications made in the course of treatment was necessary to the Illinois 
court.82 
In 1960, the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP) stated in a report 
that, “[a]mong physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need to maintain 
confidentiality.  His capacity to help his patients is completely dependent upon 
                                                                                                     
 72. Binder v. Ruvell, No. 52C2535 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 24, 1952), available at http://jaffee-
redmond.org/cases/binder.htm. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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their willingness and ability to talk freely.”83  Specifically, GAP was concerned 
that, without a psychotherapist-patient privilege, therapy would not be successful,84 
much like the concern that representation would not be effective without the 
attorney-client privilege.85  The GAP report suggested that the psychotherapist-
patient privilege mirror the attorney-client privilege in both intent and exceptions.86 
In 1961, the Connecticut legislature enacted a statute inspired by the GAP 
model for a psychotherapist privilege.87  However, the Connecticut statute was 
more detailed and “did not tie the scope of the privilege to the attorney-client 
privilege.”88  Soon after, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky and Maryland followed with 
statutes modeled after the Connecticut statute.89  
In 1969, the United States Supreme Court proposed the first Federal Rules of 
Evidence to Congress.90  Initially, the proposal included nine federal privileges, 
including the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 91  In 1973, the proposed rules came 
before Congress for approval.92  Due to political “crossfire,” Congress eliminated 
the proposed privileges for a single rule: Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 501.93  
                                                                                                     
 83. Paul W. Mosher, Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The History and Significance of the U.S. 
Supreme Court's Decision in the Case of Jaffee v. Redmond (1999) (unpublished manuscript) (emphasis 
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unconscious feelings and attitudes as well. Therapeutic effectiveness necessitates going beyond a 
patient's awareness and, in order to do this, it must be possible to communicate freely. A threat to 
secrecy blocks successful treatment.”); Smith, supra note 54, at 95 (“The psychiatrists argued, absent a 
guarantee that the words exchanged with their patients could not become evidence in a courtroom, 
patients could not fully enjoy the potential benefits of their treatment.”). 
 85. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 385 (1981). 
 86. Abraham S. Goldstein & Jay Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege: The GAP Proposal and the 
Connecticut Statute, 118 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 733, 736 (1962), available at 
http://journals.psychiatryonline.org/article.aspx?articleid=148487 ("The confidential relationship and 
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the psychiatrist-patient privilege.”).  
 87. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 86, at 733.  
 88. Smith, supra note 54, at 95; Goldstein & Katz, supra note 86, at 736 ("The GAP statute 
suggested a host of problems which call into question the appropriateness of the attorney-client 
model."). 
 89. Smith, supra note 54 at 96. 
 90. Deborah Paruch, supra note 30 at 340. 
 91. Id.; MODEL CODE EVID. R. 220-23; see  MANFRED S. GUTTMACHER & HENRY WEIHOFEN, 
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 269 (1st ed.1952).  
 92. Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under Federal Rule of Evidence 
501: The Restrictive Thesis, the Expansive Antithesis, and the Contextual Synthesis, 73 NEB. L. REV. 
511, 512 (1994).   
 93. FED. R. EVID. 501 (“Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or 
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, 
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed 
by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in 
light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of 
a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, 
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.”). 
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Instead of listing the federal privileges, Rule 501 directs the reader to the federal 
common law.94  Therefore, while the psychotherapist-patient privilege was 
originally proposed in the 1973 Rules of Evidence, it was not until 1996 that the 
United States Supreme Court held that there is a federal privilege for 
psychotherapists.95  By that year, all fifty states had adopted a psychotherapist-
patient privilege through statute or rule.96 
In 1996, in Jaffee v. Redmond97, the United States Supreme Court finally held 
that statements made to a licensed social worker in the course of psychotherapy 
treatment were protected from compelled disclosure.98  This case is a result of a 
plaintiff trying to see the defendant’s psychotherapist’s records in a wrongful death 
action.99  
In this case, a police officer, Mary Lu Redmond, responded to a report of a 
fight at an apartment complex.100  Believing that Ricky Allen was about to stab 
another man, Redmond shot and killed him.101  The administrator of Allen’s estate, 
Jaffee, brought a claim in the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois alleging that Redmond violated Allen’s constitutional rights by using 
excessive force.102  
During the discovery process, Jaffee learned that Redmond had been meeting 
with a clinical social worker, Karen Beyer.103  Jaffee requested Beyer’s notes.104 
Redmond opposed the request, claiming a psychotherapist-patient privilege 
protected the notes from disclosure.105  The Court concluded “confidential 
communications between a psychotherapist and her patient ‘promotes sufficiently 
important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.’”106  Despite the 
fact that the psychotherapist’s notes and testimony may be relevant and useful for 
the plaintiff’s case, the Court held that the interest in keeping the information 
private was more important than the interests served by disclosure.  The Court held 
that the privilege serves important public ends and thus the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege covers the confidential information communicated to licensed 
psychologists and psychiatrists as well as communications to licensed social 
workers when there is intent for the conversation to be confidential and the 
communications occurred in the course of psychotherapy.107  
The Court created a “wall of protection against disclosures” of such 
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information at the discovery stage and through litigation.108  In addition, the Court 
stated that Fed. R. Evid. 501 gives the courts the ability to “define new privileges” 
through common law, concluding that the private and public interests support the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege;109 the privilege serves private interest by 
promoting effective therapy through trust and confidence in your therapist,110 and 
the privilege serves public interests by opening a path for successful treatment, 
which promotes people to seek mental and emotional health.111  
Following the Court’s holding in Jaffee, every jurisdiction had a statutory, 
evidentiary or common-law privilege protecting communications made during 
psychotherapy treatment112 where a patient had the right to prevent the disclosure 
of confidential communication resulting from mental health treatment.113  While 
Jaffee is not binding to the states, the policy reasons behind Jaffee can be seen in 
the discussion of state privileges. 
The psychotherapist-patient privilege protects arguably the most private 
information a person can convey: their innermost struggles. Built upon a 
relationship of trust, a psychotherapist can help an individual identify and confront 
these issues.  
E.  The Maine Privilege 
As covered previously, LCSWs are considered psychotherapists under the 
current law of privileges due to the analogous role that LCSWs have in mental 
health treatment.114  However, Maine law has not always given equal protections to 
psychotherapists and social workers.  The Maine Rules of Evidence have been 
protecting psychotherapy patients for decades, however the definition of a 
“psychotherapist” has evolved with the years.  For example, in 1976, the Maine 
Rules of Evidence defined a psychotherapist as:  
A person authorized to practice medicine in any state or nation, or reasonably 
believed by the patient so to be, while engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a 
mental or emotional condition . . . [or] a person licensed or certified as a 
psychologist or psychological examiner.115 
The commentary notes that the rule “combines a general physician-patient privilege 
with the statutory privileges for psychiatrists, psychologists and psychological 
examiners.”  However, the rule did not incorporate all statutory privileges for 
mental health experts, and in 1977, the Maine Legislature further enacted a statute 
providing a conditional privilege for social workers.116  The statute is considered 
conditional because if it is necessary for the “proper administration of justice” to 
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 109. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 2. 
 110. Id. at 11.   
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disregard the privilege, the privilege will not be acknowledged, and disclosure may 
be compelled.117  This statute was most recently amended in 2001, and it currently 
states:  
Except at the request of, or with the consent of, the client, no person licensed 
under this chapter may be required to testify in any civil or criminal action, suit or 
proceeding at law or in equity respecting any information which he may have 
acquired in providing social work services to the client in a professional and 
contractual capacity if that information was necessary to enable him to furnish 
professional social work services to the client. However, when the physical or 
mental condition of the client is an issue in that action, suit or proceeding or when 
a court in the exercise of sound discretion deems the disclosure necessary to the 
proper administration of justice, no information communicated to, or otherwise 
learned by, that licensed person in connection with the provision of social work 
services may be privileged and disclosure may be required.118 
When this statute was enacted, it provided protection to a class of 
psychotherapy that would not otherwise be shielded from disclosure.  This 
privilege came into being through the licensing provisions for the profession.119  
The legislative history indicates that there was concern at the time of enactment 
that this privilege was only “illusionary” because “[i]t seems to promise privileged 
communication to the person who is talking to a licensed social worker and yet the 
court can strip this away very easily, so it sort of exists but yet it doesn't exist.”120   
Nevertheless, the bill passed, and 32 M.R.SA. § 7005 has been providing a 
qualified protection for patients of social work to this day.121 
In 2008, the Maine Rules of Evidence expanded the privilege to include 
licensed clinical social workers, thus providing more protection than 32 M.R.S.A.  
§ 7005.122  Citing Jaffee v. Redmond, the Maine advisory committee noted: “[o]f 
the various kinds of social workers covered by state licensing requirements, those 
designated and licensed as ‘clinical social workers’ seem best to fit the traditional 
role of psychotherapist as contemplated by the privilege.”123  By including licensed 
clinical social workers under the privilege in the Maine Rules of Evidence, the Law 
Court seemed to indicate that the previously used “conditional” statutory privilege 
should be pushed aside for the more protective evidentiary privilege.  However, the 
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conditional statute and its broad exceptions still remain.124 
Currently, the “Health Care Professional, Mental Health Professional, and 
Licensed Counseling Professional—Patient Privilege” (hereafter “psychotherapist-
patient privilege)125 included in the Rules of Evidence states that “[a] patient has a 
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing 
confidential communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of the 
patient’s physical, mental or emotional condition . . . .”126  The patient, the patient’s 
guardian, or the “personal representative of a deceased patient” may assert the 
privilege.127  
F.  General Exceptions to the Privilege 
While the psychotherapist-patient privilege serves important interests, there are 
still situations when the privilege must yield, and these exceptions vary by 
jurisdiction. In its recognition of the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege, the 
Jaffee Court did not provide any guidance as to the exceptions for the federal 
privilege.128  However, years earlier in the 1969 proposed federal rules of evidence 
to Congress, the psychotherapist-patient privilege included three exceptions: 1) No 
privilege for communication in order to hospitalize the patient; 2) No privilege for 
court-ordered examinations; and 3) No privilege for proceedings where the 
patient’s mental condition is instrumental to the case.129   Similar exceptions are 
found in the state-applied privileges as well.  
For example, the Maine Rules of Evidence, like the proposed Federal Rules, 
provide three distinct exceptions to the privilege.130  First, 503(e)(1) states that 
there is no privilege for communications “[r]elevant to an issue in proceedings to 
hospitalize the patient for mental illness . . . . ” if the mental health professional 
determines that the “[p]atient is in need of hospitalization.”131 Next, 503(e)(2) 
states that there is no privilege for communications related to examinations by 
order of the court.132  This is when the court orders the patient to be examined for 
physical, mental or an emotional condition.  Finally, in 503(e)(3), there is no 
privileged communication when the patient’s mental, physical, or emotional 
condition is an element of the patient’s claim or defense.133  Given that the Rules of 
Evidence specifically lay out the privilege and the exceptions in the same rule, it 
suggests that an individual need not look further in the law to know the power and 
limitations of the privilege.134 
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III.  PROTECTING THE PUBLIC 
While the protections for psychotherapy patients may appear extensive, they 
are balanced with both professional and legal exceptions.  Along with traditional 
public policy exceptions discussed above,135 the duty of confidentiality and the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege must give way when the patient expresses the 
intent to harm another individual.  
The duties and privileges protecting the patient exist because the Supreme 
Court has recognized that the psychotherapeutic relationship has more value on the 
whole when compared to the potentially probative evidence.136  However, this 
value quickly dissipates when the patient is using the therapy session to process or 
plan for a dangerous event.  This Part will look at the development of the legal 
duties in place to protect the public from potentially dangerous individuals as well 
as the issues that these exceptions have on the effectiveness of the psychotherapy 
treatment.  
A.  Ethical Duty of Confidentiality: The Duty to Report 
A notable exception to the duty of confidentiality is for dangerous patients.  
“Although confidentiality is one of the major underpinnings of psychotherapy, the 
trend of cases clearly suggests that courts regard the safety of the public as superior 
to confidentiality in therapy when the two issues are in conflict.”137  This issue was 
specifically addressed in the landmark case of Tarasoff v. Regents of California.138 
1.  Tarasoff v. Regents of California 
In 1976, the California Supreme Court held that a psychotherapist must 
disclose otherwise confidential information when the psychotherapists determine 
that his patient poses a serious threat of danger to a third party to protect potential 
victims.139  The Tarasoff case began in August of 1969 when Prosenjit Poddar, a 
psychotherapy patient of Dr. Lawrence Moore, told his therapist that he intended to 
kill Tatiana Tarasoff.140  Dr. Moore informed campus police who briefly detained 
Poddar, but neither Dr. Moore nor the campus police took any additional action.141  
Two months later, in October of 1969, Poddar killed Tarasoff.142  
Tarasoff’s parents sued the Regents of California, Dr. Moore’s employer, 
claiming that Poddar had expressed his intention to kill their daughter to Dr. 
Moore, and therefore the Regents of California were responsible for their 
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daughter’s death through the respondeat superior doctrine.143  In response to 
Tarasoff’s claim, the Regents of California maintained that they owed no duty to 
the victim.144  
In the Court’s holding, the California Supreme Court created what has come to 
be known as the “Tarasoff duty”—a duty imposed on psychotherapists to protect 
third parties from reasonably foreseeable harm caused by their patients.145  In this 
holding, the court recognized that, in some situations, only psychotherapists could 
avert imminent harm through their disclosure.146  The Court recognized that 
psychotherapists would need to walk a fine line when assessing whether or not 
their patient might act in a dangerous or violent manner.147  While the court does 
not “require that the therapist, in making that determination, render a perfect 
performance,” the psychotherapist should implement a “reasonable degree of skill, 
knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of that 
professional specialty under similar circumstances.’”148  The duty is only triggered 
when the mental health expert believes that the patient will act on his or her 
statement or threat.  
In response to this holding, and in order to protect the therapeutic relationship, 
psychologists are expected to discuss the “relevant limits of confidentiality” with 
their patients.149  This is important so that patients understand that, while their 
information is generally confidential, this is not a guarantee, and hopefully the 
psychotherapist and the patient can work through the disclosure and preserve the 
therapeutic relationship. 
In Maine, mental health experts are held to a similar provision to disclose 
otherwise confidential information when their patients pose a threat of harm: “A 
licensed mental health professional shall disclose protected health information that 
the professional believes is necessary to avert a serious and imminent threat to 
health or safety when the disclosure is made in good faith to any person . . . who is 
reasonably able to prevent or minimize the threat.”150  
The majority of states are now following the Tarasoff decision, either through 
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statute or common law.151  However, Tarasoff does not address the evidentiary 
issues that lay tangent to the Tarasoff duty to disclose, namely its relationship with 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.152 
B.  The Evidentiary Privilege: The Dangerous Patient Exception 
Similar to the duty of confidentiality, there are certain situations where a court 
may compel the unauthorized disclosure of a patient’s information because the 
threat of harm is more serious than the need to protect the information.  It is 
necessary to note, however, that disclosing information under an exception to the 
privilege is distinct from the Tarasoff disclosures.  
Under Tarasoff, a psychotherapist is under a duty to protect potential victims 
by excusing the ethical duty of confidentiality to deliver this warning.  However, 
the dangerous-patient exception requires the psychotherapist to push aside the 
evidentiary psychotherapist-patient privilege and testify as to confidential details in 
order to protect a third party.  As the Ninth circuit noted, the Tarasoff duty to report 
and the testimonial privilege are distinct concepts, and the duty to report does not 
necessarily trigger a “an abrogation of the federal testimonial privilege.”153   
While analogous, the harm from a dangerous-patient exception may surpass 
the harm from a Tarasoff disclosure because the patient’s rights and liberties can be 
significantly impeded as a result of the psychotherapist’s testimony.  The fear that 
the psychotherapist might disclose confidential information may prevent a patient 
from being completely honest.  However, this apprehension might intensify if there 
is a threat of prosecution in a courtroom, where the patient’s most private and 
embarrassing thoughts might be forever codified in a court record.   
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the advisory 
committee for the 1969 proposed rules specifically noted that the rules did not 
include an exception for when a patient threatens harm against another:  
Its members were persuaded that, as a class, patients willing to express to 
psychiatrists their intention to commit crime are not ordinarily likely to carry out 
that intention.  Instead, they are making a plea for help.  The very making of such 
pleas affords the psychiatrist his unique opportunity to work with patients in an 
attempt to resolve their problems.  Such resolutions would be impeded if patients 
were unable to speak freely for fear of possible disclosure at a later date in a legal 
proceeding.154 
However, in the 1996 Jaffee decision, the United States Supreme Court alluded to 
the possibility of a dangerous-patient exception.155  This exception permits the 
psychotherapist to testify as to otherwise privileged information without the 
patient’s consent if there is reason to believe the patient poses a threat of imminent 
harm against a third party.156  
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Although it would be premature to speculate about most future developments in 
the federal psychotherapist privilege, we do not doubt that there are situations in 
which the privilege must give way, for example, if a serious threat of harm to the 
patient or to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the 
therapist.157 
Although the United States Supreme Court affirmed that psychotherapists couldn’t 
be compelled to testify about a patient’s confidential disclosures, the Jaffee 
footnote could be seen as suggesting a dangerous-patient exception when there is a 
serious threat of harm to the patient or another person.158 
The issue that the dangerous-patient exception seeks to address is that 
sometimes there are people who pose a serious threat of imminent harm against 
others, the only person who knows about this threat is the psychotherapist, and the 
only way to avert that harm is through the therapist’s testimony.159  Currently there 
is a federal circuit split as to whether a dangerous-patient exception should apply, 
and only some states have chosen to incorporate a dangerous-patient exception into 
that jurisdiction.160  
The conflict about whether to incorporate a dangerous-patient exception hinges 
on the patient’s privacy interest compared to the protection of potential victims.  
For example, in United States v. Chase, the Court noted that “[i]f our Nation’s 
mental health is indeed as valuable as the Supreme Court has indicated, and we 
think it is, the chilling effect that would result from the recognition of a ‘dangerous 
patient’ exception and its logical consequences is the first reason to reject it.”161   
The value of the psychotherapist-patient relationship resonated with the Court and 
led to the rejection of a dangerous-patient exception in the Ninth Circuit.  However, 
not all jurisdictions agree. With the Jaffee footnote as the foundation, several 
federal jurisdictions have decided, one way or another, on whether to acknowledge 
a dangerous-patient exception.   
In United States v. Auster, the Fifth Circuit recognized the dangerous-patient 
exception, but refused to apply it to the facts of this case because the defendant did 
not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in the threats he made.162   
Therefore, if the dangerous-patient exception is to apply, it is necessary to ensure 
that the privilege has been established.  
In United States v. Glass, the Tenth Circuit held that a dangerous-patient 
exception is appropriate if the threat is serious when the threat is made.163  In its 
holding, the Court looked to Jaffee164 and established that the federal 
psychotherapist-patient privilege does apply in this case.165  However, depending 
on whether the threat conveyed during a psychotherapy session was “serious when 
it was uttered and whether its disclosure was the only means of averting harm,” the 
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privilege may be excused under the dangerous-patient exception.166  The Tenth 
Circuit remanded to inquire further into the seriousness of the threat and the 
available options.167   
The above referenced federal cases fell into line with the dangerous-patient 
exception foreshadowed and outlined in Jaffee footnote 19.168  The dangerous-
patient exception should only apply if the privilege has first been established,169 the 
threat communicated was serious when said, and there is no other way to avert the 
harm than by excusing the privilege.170 
While federal courts sparked the nation-wide conversation, several states have 
independently addressed the issue.  For example, California incorporated a 
dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege in their Rules 
of Evidence: “There is no privilege under this article if the psychotherapist has 
reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or emotional condition 
as to be dangerous to himself or to the person or property of another and that 
disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the threatened danger.”171 
California is a state that has enacted legislation that provides that therapists may 
testify against their patients if they believe the patient would be dangerous to 
himself or another.172  The Law Revision Commission commented that:  
Although the dangerous-patient exception might inhibit the relationship between 
the patient and his psychotherapist to a limited extent, it is essential that 
appropriate action be taken if the psychotherapist becomes convinced during the 
course of treatment that the patient is a menace to himself or others and the patient 
refuses to permit the psychotherapist to make the disclosure necessary to prevent 
the threatened danger.173 
Other than California, few states have statutes that clearly indicate whether or 
not a dangerous-patient exception exists.174  For example, Illinois permits the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege to be abrogated in situations like “trials for 
homicide when the disclosure relates directly to the fact or immediate 
circumstances of the homicide.”175  Wyoming law will excuse the privilege in 
situations where “an immediate threat of physical violence against a readily 
identifiable victim is disclosed to the psychologist.”176  Likewise, Ohio law permits 
a court to compel the “testimony” of a psychotherapist if there is a “clear and 
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present danger to the client or other persons.”177 
When considering the dangerous-patient exception, some commentators argue 
that an exception is appropriate because, due to the other enumerated exceptions,178 
the impact on the privilege would be minimal.179  This argument is countered by 
the contention that another exception, especially an unpredictable exception, could 
lead to the evisceration of the privilege and destroy the relationships that the 
privilege aims to protect.180  
Given the current events and past holdings considering a dangerous-patient 
exception, it is fair to say that the psychotherapy-patient privilege might need to 
give way in extreme circumstances to protect the health and safety of the greater 
population.  However, in order to keep the current benefits of psychotherapy while 
adding the benefits of the dangerous-patient exception, the situation must be 
specific, limited and extreme to properly co-exist with the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.  
IV.  THE MAINE ISSUE: 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 IS AN ANTIQUATED STATUTE THAT 
UNDERMINES THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP AND THE INTENT OF 
THE MAINE RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Arguably, “dangerous” individuals who make threatening statements in 
therapy are those who could benefit the most from continued mental health 
treatment.  The privilege serves a public and private interest by promoting this 
mental health treatment, and an exception to the privilege, such as the dangerous-
patient exception, could prove detrimental not only to the individual’s treatment, 
but for the safety and wellbeing of the greater population.181  Therefore, proceeding 
with a dangerous-patient exception, or any exception that uproots the protection of 
the privilege, should be done with careful regard for the intent of the privilege in 
the first place. 
The issue facing Maine LCSW patients is that 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 goes 
beyond the dangerous-patient exception to allow the court to set aside the privilege 
in any circumstance the court finds necessary.182  While the Maine Rules of 
Evidence incorporated LCSWs into the protection originally afforded to 
psychologists and psychotherapists, this effort is fruitless as long as this statute 
continues to conflict.183  If the privilege is going to be effective, patients “[m]ust be 
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able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be 
protected.”184  This broad discretion afforded to the courts creates an uncertainty to 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege for LCSWs because the application of the 
protection would vary depending on the court’s understanding of when justice 
requires the disclosure. This Maine statute leaves the fate of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege to the unpredictable discretion of the court, and renders the 2008 
amendment of the Rules of Evidence ineffective.185  
For example, when a daughter sought a protection from abuse order from the 
Maine District Court in Biddeford against her mother, the court held that the 
LCSW would be compelled to testify against her patient as to the threats the mother 
made against her daughter.186   
On June 18, 2013, a police officer arrived at the daughter’s home to inform her 
that her mother made threats against her life during a counseling session with a 
LCSW.187  The police were notified of this threat when the LCSW, based on her 
professional judgment, believed that the threat was credible, and that she had an 
ethical duty to inform and warn the potential victim.188  Based on the LCSW’s tip, 
the police notified the daughter of the threat, but did not take any additional action 
against the mother.189  
In fear for her life, the daughter turned to the Maine District Court in 
Biddeford, and was granted a temporary protection order under the Protection from 
Abuse statute, 19-A M.R.S.A. §4001, et seq. (PFA).190  The matter was set for 
hearing on August 19, 2013.191  In the meantime, the daughter subpoenaed the 
LCSW to testify at the hearing.192   The LCSW filed a motion to quash the subpoena 
citing the psychotherapist-patient privilege.193  The daughter filed an opposition to 
the motion to quash, and in addition she filed a motion to compel the counselor’s 
testimony.194  And finally, the mother objected to the motion to compel.195  
The court held a hearing on the pending motions.196  The issue was whether or 
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not the court could compel the LCSW to testify as to potentially privileged 
information in a PFA hearing.197  
The mother argued that, while it is true that the court can compel a mental 
health expert to testify, the statements made would be inadmissible under the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege.198  The daughter argued that the Maine Rules of 
Evidence list of exceptions to the psychotherapist-privilege was not exhaustive, and 
therefore the court could read in a dangerous-patient exception to compel the 
therapist to testify.199 
On the one hand is the daughter’s safety; the alleged homicidal threats are the 
only evidence that the daughter has to get protection against her mother from the 
court.  However, on the other hand is the mother’s privacy and mental health; if the 
LCSW is forced to testify against her, the mother may not ever receive the mental 
health treatment she needs for fear that her most intimate thoughts will be revealed 
in a courtroom setting.   
As to the admissibility of the LCSW’s testimony, the court held that the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege was not “an absolute bar to testimony,” and that, 
in this case, the court would hear from the psychotherapist.200  The court came to 
this holding because the LCSW had already disclosed the alleged threat to the 
police, and because the court had “express statutory authority to allow disclosure of 
confidential communications made to the social work[er] when ‘necessary to the 
proper administration of justice.’”201  The court found this protection hearing to be 
an appropriate situation to compel a psychotherapist’s testimony.202  
Without the therapist’s testimony, the court could not properly assess if the 
daughter could obtain a PFA order to protect her against imminent harm because 
the only way for the daughter to obtain an order was to prove that her mother made 
a threat against her life, and the only admissible evidence of this fact was the 
LCSWs testimony.203  
The court held that although the exceptions to Maine’s psychotherapy-
privilege do not apply in this case, the statutes permit the LCSW’s limited 
disclosure.204  Therefore, the court looked to this statutory grant of authority, and 
held that the information was not privileged and the LCSW could testify as to the 
homicidal threats the mother made during treatment.205 
In its holding, the court was mindful of the potential implications of this 
ruling—if the LCSW’s testimony is not limited, the harm done to the mother’s 
psychotherapy treatment would far exceed the benefit of the disclosure.206  In an 
effort to serve both parties’ interests, the court limited the LCSW’s testimony and 
disclosure.207  In the court’s order on the Motion to Quash, the court said: 
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(1) [The LCSW] will be ordered to testify about the report she made to the 
Biddeford Police Department, namely what statements she made to the police in 
such report.   
(2) The court may further order [the LCSW] to testify about facts that gave rise to 
her decision to make that report, including statements made by Defendant, but 
reserves final ruling on this to trial.  
(3) Other statements made or information acquired in the course of the counseling 
relationship between [the mother] and the LCSW beyond the scope of items 1 and 
2, above, are determined to be privileged and outside the scope of permitted 
testimony, unless Defendant opens the door through her examination of the 
LCSW.  
(4) The subpoena does not request production of any documents, and therefore the 
LCSW will not be required to produce any such documents, records or notes.  To 
the extent the LCSW uses and documents or records to refresh her recollection, 
disclosure may be required in accordance with Rule 612.208  
This ruling used the power granted to the court via statute, as well as the 
underlying social policy of the privilege to strike a balance between privacy and 
protection.  In this situation, the only way for the potential victim to receive 
protection, absent an agreement, was through the clinical social worker’s 
disclosure.  There was no other evidence available.  
However, the court’s use of 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 in this context opens the door 
not only for a dangerous-patient exception in Maine but for a total abrogation of the 
psychotherapist privilege permitted under the Maine Rules of Evidence for 
LCSWs, because the fate of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in regard to social 
workers is left to the discretion of the hearing judge.  The conditions set forth in the 
statute run contrary to the goals of the current evidentiary privilege because it can 
cause a serious disruption in the therapist-patient relationship.  Under 32 M.R.S.A. 
§ 7005, the psychotherapist can be compelled to testify against their patient, an 
event that undoubtedly disrupts, if not forever severs, the psychotherapist-patient 
relationship that the Maine Rules of Evidence sought to protect. 
As Justice Rehnquist wrote in Upjohn Co. v. United States, an “uncertain 
privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying 
applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”209  If Maine is to 
maintain an effective psychotherapist-patient privilege for LCSWs, the statute must 
be adjusted to limit its discretion under § 7005 to serious threats of harm when the 
patient has actual knowledge of the limits of confidentiality, and when there is no 
other reasonable means to avert the harm.  In addition, the psychotherapist’s 
testimony should be limited in scope to preserve as much of the relationship as 
possible.  For the future of the Maine social workers, and the mental health 
treatment they provide, courts must limit their discretion under 32 M.R.S.A. § 
7005. 
V.  THE SOLUTION 
In order to properly protect LCSW patients, and to acknowledge the intent of 
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the 2008 amendment to the Maine Rules of Evidence, the conditional privilege in 
32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 needs to change.  Therefore the Maine Legislature should look 
to amend § 7005 to reflect the 2008 incorporation of LCSWs into the Maine Rules 
of Evidence psychotherapist-patient privilege and associated protections and 
exceptions.   
However, as long as 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 remains in its current form, Maine 
courts should use their discretion to protect and preserve the Maine 
psychotherapist-patient privilege. The following recommendation provides a 
format to protect the integrity of the privilege, while still allowing a limited 
exception in the event of an imminent threat of bodily harm until the legislature can 
address the discrepancy.210  Given that Maine does not have an enumerated 
dangerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, this 
recommendation reflects upon the discussion and policy arguments concerning the 
benefits and downfalls of dangerous-patient exceptions from other jurisdictions.  
A.  The Patient has Actual Knowledge of the Rights and Exceptions  
Under the Privilege 
One of the fundamental aspects to creating a strong therapeutic relationship is 
the concept of trust; without trust, a patient is less likely to disclose the inner 
conflicts to receive the proper psychoanalysis and treatment.211  While the limits of 
confidentiality are often enumerated in publically available records, 
“confidentiality is a protection [that is] often assumed by patients to be total, but 
known by therapists to be severely limited.”212  Because of this assumption, it is 
important for therapists to inform their patients that the protections are not absolute 
because “disclosing information about a patient without knowledge or consent 
would be a breach of trust.”213 
Currently, neither Maine LCSWs nor patients can predict whether or not the 
information discussed will be protected by the privilege due to the statutory 
exception in § 7005.  Because the protections and exceptions are unknown to both 
parties, it is difficult to establish a trusting therapeutic relationship, and whatever 
relationship is built can be easily shattered by the therapist’s compelled disclosure 
at a future testimonial hearing.  
By understanding the protections and limits of the privilege, a patient (and the 
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psychotherapist) can more reasonably predict what will happen with the disclosed 
information, and build a stronger relationship on that mutual understanding.  As the 
United States Supreme Court noted in regard to the attorney-client privilege, the 
purpose of the privilege is only fulfilled if “the attorney and client [can] predict 
with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.”214  
Once this foundation is set, any compelled disclosures under one of the exceptions 
to the privilege is less likely to destroy the relationship because the patient was 
aware of the possibility of disclosure – there was no deception and therefore no 
violation of the trust.215 
Some scholars have suggested that the dangerous-patient exceptions should not 
apply unless the patient has been given explicit warning that the threats will not be 
kept confidential.216  The ethical duty of confidentiality under the American 
Psychological Association includes the requirement for the psychotherapist to 
disclose “the relevant limitations on confidentiality” at the beginning of 
treatment.217  Therefore, informing the patient about the rights (and the limits of 
those rights) under the evidentiary privilege would not put an unnecessary strain on 
the therapeutic relationship, and can help to preserve the relationship. 
By analogy, some scholars were concerned that the Tarasoff disclosures would 
lead to more dangerous people because those individuals would be deterred from 
seeking mental health treatment.218  However, through the proper warnings during 
treatment, it appears that patients and the mental health professionals can continue 
a relationship.219  While testifying in a court on a public record is vastly different 
than a therapist disclosing the otherwise confidential information to an authorized 
person, there is hope that the Maine psychotherapist-patient privilege will remain 
strong, while still providing protection to potential victims if the patient is given 
adequate warning that any compelled disclosure is not meant as a sign of betrayal.  
In addition, any threat made against another person after this warning can be 
considered serious, permitting the psychotherapist to disclose under Tarasoff. 
While notice is important, it is necessary to recognize that the warning will 
influence the future therapeutic relationship.220   While some professionals advise 
to give notice at the beginning of treatment, others suggest withholding the warning 
until a threat has been made.221  In this scenario, the patient will have one bite of 
the apple, so to speak, before a therapist may need to testify against him.  This 
benefits the psychotherapist relationship because the patient is not burdened with 
the idea of disclosure prior to revealing his violent intentions.  
                                                                                                     
 214. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). 
 215. Ralph Slovenko, Comment, Psychotherapy and Confidentiality, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 375, 395 
(1975) (“Trust---not absolute confidentiality---is the cornerstone of psychotherapy. Talking about a 
patient or writing about him without his knowledge or consent would be a breach of trust. But imposing 
control where self-control breaks down is not a breach of trust when it is not deceptive. And it is not 
necessary to be deceptive.”).   
 216. Brian P. McKeever, Contours and Chaos: A Proposal for Courts to Apply the "Dangerous 
Patient" Exception to the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 34 N.M. L. REV. 109, 137 (2004). 
 217. APA Duty of Confidentiality, supra note 39. 
 218. See id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 892-93. 
 221. Klinka, supra note 29 at 891-92. 
158 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1 
However, this approach would require the psychotherapists to have a serious 
talk about the limits of confidentiality after the therapeutic relationship has been 
established.  This conversation alone could impact the future of the relationship 
because the patient might believe the psychotherapist was not upfront with the 
patient from the beginning.  In addition, if a dangerous patient were going to act 
after a single threat, it would be against public policy to disregard that serious 
comment because the psychotherapist waited to inform the patient of his rights. 
B.  No Other Reasonable Way to Avert the Harm 
Even if the patient is adequately warned about the limits of the privilege, the 
psychotherapist-patient relationship should still be protected.  Psychotherapy still 
serves important public and private interests, interests that should not be entirely 
set aside simply because patients appear dangerous.  As the Jaffee footnote 
suggests, the court should not use the dangerous-patient exception unless there is 
no other reasonable way to avert the harm.222  When applying the broad exception 
of § 7005, the value of the therapeutic relationship should be ever-present in the 
court’s consideration.  If the imminent harm can be averted by other means, those 
avenues should be explored before a therapist is compelled to testify. 
One avenue that should always be explored before the application of a 
dangerous-patient exception is the Tarasoff duty to disclose.  If speaking with the 
potential victim or the police quells the threatened harm, there is no need for the 
therapist to testify in court.  Generally, if there is a threat of harm against a third 
party, the potential victim can find protection through realms other than compelling 
a psychotherapist to testify.  Therefore, a § 7005 exception should only be used 
when disclosure is the only way to protect an individual from imminent harm.  
If after trying to alleviate the potential harm through other means, the potential 
victim is still in need of protection, compelling a psychotherapist to testify at a 
hearing that can offer such protection is appropriate.  For example, in the 
Donaldson case,223 the psychotherapist informed the police about the threat, and the 
potential victim was made aware of the threat, but even with this knowledge, the 
threat remained imminent.  When the potential victim appealed to the court for 
relief via the PFA statute, the court appropriately used its discretion to offer her 
protection.224 
C.  A Psychotherapist Should Only be Compelled to Testify in a  
Hearing that can Reasonably Avert the Harm 
The original intent of the dangerous-patient exception, as stated in the Jaffee 
footnote, is to compel otherwise confidential disclosures to avert imminent harm.225  
Considering this intent, the only appropriate venue for a dangerous-patient 
exception in Maine is in testimonial hearings that can reasonably avert the 
threatened harm, such as Protection from Abuse and bail hearings. 
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A Protection from Abuse (PFA) order is available to a person when a family or 
household member attempts or commits: 1) physical harm; 2) to force someone to 
do something from which they have a right to abstain; 3) put another in fear of 
physical harm through threats, harassment or tormenting behavior; 4) to force 
another to unlawfully restrict the movement of another person; or 5) to repeatedly 
follow or stalk another.226  One purpose for this court-authorized protection is “[t]o 
allow family and household members who are victims of domestic abuse to obtain 
expeditious and effective protection against further abuse so that the lives of the 
non-abusing family or household members are as secure and uninterrupted as 
possible.”227  But what happens when the only way to afford this protection is by 
peeking into the private communications between the defendant and his/her 
psychotherapist?  
The dangerous-patient exception can play a critical role in the outcome of both 
the defendant’s mental health treatment and the plaintiff’s sense of security.  With 
proper safeguards in place, the court should be able to compel limited disclosure to 
be able to offer the potential victim legal protection from the threatened harm. 
The Maine PFA statute provides relief to victims of abuse, which includes 
threatened harm.228  The court can grant interim relief through an ex-parte hearing 
to provide protection from imminent harm, pending a full hearing.229  After a full 
hearing, or a consent agreement, the court can order protection for up to two 
years.230  Given that a PFA hearing provides protection against imminent harm, it is 
appropriate for a psychotherapist to testify as to the threatened harm in this 
situation. 
Focusing specifically on Maine cases, the exception would be appropriate if 
the therapist’s testimony were the only way to offer legal protection.  Compelled 
testimony in the case of restraining orders appears to be a “necessary outgrowth of 
the therapist’s ‘Tarasoff duty to protect potential victims from harm.’”231  This is 
because offering their knowledge in a court of law to secure protection is not an 
unreasonable approach when a life is on the line.  
Another testimonial hearing that would be appropriate for a dangerous-patient 
exception is the bail hearing.  If an incarcerated person poses an imminent threat to 
another, the court has the ability to immediately deter that harm by keeping the 
individual in jail.  However, other than bail hearings, the dangerous-patient 
exception should not be used in criminal law.232   
First, the dangerous-patient exception was born out of the idea of averting 
harm, and the purpose of a criminal trial is to punish; second, given the time delays 
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between the incident and the trial, the harm has likely passed by the time the 
testimonial privilege can be waived by a dangerous-patient exception.233  
Furthermore, a patient who made a threat against another during a psychotherapy 
session is “not likely to actually commit the act once court proceedings have 
begun.”234  With this in mind, civil protection order cases or bail hearings are the 
only appropriate context for the psychotherapist to prevent the harm from 
occurring.  
However, even if the hearing has the power to prevent imminent harm, the 
exception should not be used if there is other evidence that would support a finding 
of abuse and reasonable fear.  Therefore, the court should be awarded the discretion 
to conduct an in camera review of the information before it becomes public 
knowledge to assess if the confidential information is relevant and necessary to the 
issuance of protection. 
D.  The Psychotherapist’s Testimony Should be Limited to Only the Information 
Needed to Prevent the Imminent Harm 
Finally, even if a psychotherapist is compelled to testify to offer protection in a 
limited situation, there are steps available to the court to limit and protect this 
information.  Maine’s statute 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 is particularly concerning 
because LCSW patients are exposed to an unrestricted exception that has the 
potential to go far beyond the intent of Maine’s lawmakers.  For example, 
therapist’s testimony about threatened harm can easily spin out of control, and 
require disclosure of personal and irrelevant information, if the LCSW’s are 
required to give the reasons the therapist believed the threat to be credible in the 
first place.  Therefore, a court should limit the testimony to only what is strictly 
necessary to offer protection.235  
In most cases, the psychotherapist should only be permitted to testify to the 
threat conveyed in the psychotherapy session.  This information is enough to 
satisfy the PFA statute as well as a judge in a bail hearing if the patient 
communicates a threat of violence against another and the potential victim is put in 
reasonable fear that the patient will follow through on that threat.236  Therefore, 
only the psychotherapist’s testimony to the statement made, the statement that 
would be necessary to report under a Tarasoff duty, would be permitted.  However, 
testimony that explores the reasons why the psychotherapist reported under the 
Tarasoff duty would go too far.   
If there is a debate as to whether the psychotherapist’s testimony is probative, 
the court should conduct an in camera review of the testimony to verify its 
necessity before the therapist is examined on the public record.  This policy returns 
to the fact that the psychotherapist-patient relationship is one the court should look 
to protect if possible.  The courtroom should not be a way for litigators to fish for 
evidence locked beneath the psychotherapist-patient privilege.  This exception 
should only push the privilege aside when a threat of imminent harm is present, and 
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it should only be used to the extent necessary to provide protection. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Maine LCSWs face an uncertain privilege; as long as 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 
provides a conditional privilege that conflicts with the Maine Rules of Evidence, 
the balance between protecting the patient and protecting the public is askew.  As it 
stands, a LCSW patient is exposed—while the duty of confidentiality protects the 
patient to a certain extent, the court can compel a LCSW to disclose the patient’s 
innermost thoughts, urges and conflicts on the public record at any time in any 
testimonial hearing.  In response, the psychotherapist relationship may suffer, and 
the patient may not receive the best mental health treatment. Therefore, the statute 
needs to be amended to be clear about the protections offered under Maine law to 
LCSW patients.  
Until the statute is amended, Maine courts should exercise their discretion to 
protect the intent and purpose of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.  If a court is 
inclined to use the statute to provide protection to a potential victim, it should only 
be when the patient has actual knowledge of the rights and exceptions under the 
privilege, when there is no other reasonable way to avert the harm, when the 
LCSWs testimony would be in a hearing that can reasonably avert the harm, and 
when the LCSWs testimony is limited to only the information needed to prevent 
the harm. 
  

